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‘Attempted threat’ crimes and Oduwole
ast month, an appellate
court reversed the
conviction of Olutosin
Oduwole — a former
Southern Illinois
University student and aspiring
rap artist — for an “attempt to
make a terroristic threat” (People
v. Oduwole, __ N.E.2d __, 2013
WL 885173 (Ill. App. 5th Dist.,
March 6, 2013)).
The case became a cause
célèbre in the blogosphere when
Illinois Attorney General Lisa M.
Madigan announced she would
appeal the decision to the Illinois
Supreme Court. The notion
circulating on the Internet is that
Oduwole is being victimized by
overzealous prosecutors who are
persecuting him for no more
than drafting provocative song
lyrics.
But the idea that First
Amendment values are at stake
in the case is misconceived.
The case merits our attention
not because prosecutors credulously equated song lyrics with
weapons of mass destruction,
but rather because Oduwole’s
prosecution threatens to stretch
the law of attempt in Illinois
beyond reasonable bounds, by
punishing conduct — an
“attempted threat” — even when
that conduct holds no real possibility of bringing about an
imminent social harm.
Police were already investigating Oduwole for possible
firearms violations in July 2007,
when they found his abandoned
car on the SIU campus in
Edwardsville and impounded it.
During an inventory search,
officers discovered a piece of
paper covered with handwriting.
The paper included violent and
sexually suggestive rap lyrics, as
well as what seemed to be a draft
of an extortion note, demanding
that money be sent to a PayPal
account or else “a murderous
rampage similar to the VT
shooting will occur at another
highly populated university.”
The massacre of students at

L

Virginia Tech had happened just
a few months before Oduwole’s
arrest and, chillingly, the
shootings at Northern Illinois
University would happen just
seven months later. The passage
concluded, “THIS IS NOT A
JOKE!”
The lyrics were written in
black ink, while the threatening
passage was in blue. At trial, the
jury also learned that Oduwole
had purchased four high-caliber
firearms with high-capacity
magazines on-line, that he’d kept
a loaded firearm on campus
without permission and that he’d
opened a PayPal account under a
pseudonym. In light of this
evidence and counter to the
position taken by Oduwole’s
lawyers, the jury found that the
passage about the “murderous
rampage” was not part of
Oduwole’s rap lyrics.
The jury’s conclusion that
Oduwole intended to make a
terroristic threat was certainly a
reasonable one, making it
difficult to see why some
commentators are reading this
case as a threat to artistic
freedom. What should cause us
concern, however, is the prospect
that in Illinois our law of attempt
could be stretched to reach
someone like Oduwole, whose
activity did not bring him close
to harming anyone.
To be sure, where there is
evidence that a person intends to
commit a crime and that he has
the firmness of purpose to follow
through with it, we want to allow
the police latitude to intervene
and make an arrest before the
public is put at risk. That’s why
the common law’s “last step” rule
— which allowed a conviction for
attempt only if the defendant did
everything necessary to
complete his crime — has been
universally abandoned.
At the same time, we do not
punish for thoughts alone; we
want to be certain a defendant
really would have followed
through with his criminal plan
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before we feel justified in
punishing him.
The earlier we draw the line
between acts of mere preparation and criminally liable
attempts, the less certain we can
be that the defendant wouldn’t
have abandoned his scheme altogether. In Illinois, for example, by
statute, a defendant can be held
liable for an attempt quite early
— once he takes a “substantial
step in a course of conduct
planned to culminate in [his]
commission of the crime” (720
ILCS 5/8-4(a)). Nonetheless, the
Illinois Supreme Court has
construed this provision to
authorize liability only where the
defendant’s conduct brings him
within “dangerous proximity” of
completing his intended crime
(People v. Terrell, 459 N.E.2d 1337,
1341 (Ill. 1984)).
The appellate court in
Oduwole’s case held that no
reasonable jury could have
concluded that Oduwole came
dangerously close to making a
terroristic threat, observing that
his threatening note was left in
his own car out of sight of the
public and that there was no
evidence he was about to post
the note to the Internet or
otherwise distribute it.
But beyond observations of
this nature, the court did little to
explain why its conclusion was
any more or less reasonable than
that of the jury, which heard the
same evidence firsthand and
concluded the opposite.
The appellate court’s decision
should nonetheless be affirmed,
because although Oduwole may
have been dangerously close to
making a terroristic threat, the
danger of any imminent harm to

anyone from Oduwole’s conduct
was exceedingly remote. Why?
Because Oduwole was not
accused of attempting to commit
a terroristic act (something
which we rightly want police to
interrupt early in a suspect’s
course of conduct), but rather of
attempting to threaten to
commit a terroristic act.
Under these circumstances,
there was no appreciable danger
to the public that required police
intervention at this early stage in
Oduwole’s conduct. Had the
police failed to intervene before
Oduwole completed his
“attempted” crime, then
Oduwole would have succeeded
in doing no more than making a
threat to commit a further crime.
“Threat” crimes are what we
call inchoate, meaning they are
designed to criminalize conduct
that is preparatory to the
completion of more serious
crimes. “Attempt” crimes are
likewise inchoate in nature,
because they allow us to punish
someone before he completed his
criminal conduct. “Attempted
threat” crimes are therefore
doubly inchoate and allow
punishment for conduct that in
most (if not all) cases is unlikely
imminently to cause any actual
social harm — even if the
primary crime is a serious one,
as in Oduwole’s case.
Whether criminal liability is
ever justified for “attempted
threat” crimes is an academic
question that the Illinois
Supreme Court will not likely
address in this matter.
It would be worthwhile,
though, for the court to hear the
Oduwole case in order to clarify
what “dangerous proximity”
means in the context of
“attempted threat” and other
doubly inchoate types of crimes.
Critics of Oduwole’s prosecution
are correct that his case implicates important legal principles,
but threats to the First
Amendment are not among
them.

Copyright © 2013 Law Bulletin Publishing Company. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission from Law Bulletin Publishing Company.

